

On the Set Theory of Fitch-Prawitz

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- Cantor's Set Theory with **full Comprehension** ($\{x \mid A(x)\}$ is a set for **any formula A**) is **inconsistent**.
- This made Foundational Theories of only sets almost a taboo.
- Few exceptions: **Quine's NF** and the **Theory of Hyperuniverses** [Forti-Honsell] restrict the class of formulæ in the Comprehension Principle, and preserve **extensionality**.
- A different approach [Fitch-Prawitz]: **full comprehension**, but restrict the shape of deductions to **normal(izable) deductions**.
- FP theory is quite powerful: we give a **Fixed Point Theorem**, whereby one can show that **all recursive functions** are definable.
- We show how to encode the highly unorthodox **side condition** of FP in a Logical Framework using **locked types**.
- We provide a **connection** between **FP** and **Hyperuniverses**: the strongly extensional quotient of the coalgebra of closed terms of FP satisfies the abstraction principle for **Generalized Positive Formulæ**.

The Theory of Fitch-Prawitz (FP)

Terms $t ::= x \mid \lambda x.A$

Formulae $A ::= \perp \mid \neg A \mid A \wedge A \mid A \vee A \mid A \rightarrow A \mid \forall x.A \mid \exists x.A \mid t \in u$,
where $\neg A$ is an abbreviation for $A \rightarrow \perp$, and $\lambda x.A$ denotes $\{x \mid A\}$.

Some rules (classical version)

$$\wedge I) \frac{A \quad B}{A \wedge B}$$

$$\wedge E) \frac{A \wedge B}{A} \quad \frac{A \wedge B}{B}$$

(A)

\vdots

$$\rightarrow I) \frac{B}{A \rightarrow B}$$

$$\rightarrow E) \frac{A \quad A \rightarrow B}{B}$$

($\neg A$)

\vdots

$$\perp) \frac{\perp}{A}$$

$$\forall I) \frac{A[y/x]}{\forall x.A}$$

$$\forall E) \frac{\forall x.A}{A[t/x]}$$

$$\lambda I) \frac{A[t/x]}{t \in \lambda x.A}$$

$$\lambda E) \frac{t \in \lambda x.A}{A[t/x]}$$

- Standard deductions are called **quasi-deductions** in FP.
- **Maximum formula** in a deduction: a formula that is both the consequence of an application of a I-rule or of the \perp -rule, and (major) premiss of an application of the corresponding E-rule.
- A **deduction** in FP is a quasi-deduction with **no** maximum formulæ, *i.e.* a **normal** proof.
- Considering simply proofs which do not derive \perp would lead to complications, because subproofs with conclusion \perp are necessary.

Theorem

Normal proofs cannot derive \perp , hence FP is consistent.

- The \perp -rule is classical negation and it encompasses the **double negation** rule $\frac{\neg\neg A}{A}$, and the rule **ex falso sequitur quodlibet** $\frac{\perp}{A}$.
- Full elimination rules are not admissible. *E.g.* **Modus Ponens** cannot be applied naïvely.
- The constraint of considering quasi-deductions to be legal only if already in **normal form** can be weakened to allow for **normalizable** quasi-derivations.
- Scotus rule **ex absurdis sequitur quodlibet** $\frac{A \quad \neg A}{\perp}$ is **not** admissible. But Aristotle's **non-contradiction** principle fails: $\vdash_{\text{FP}} A \wedge \neg A$. Thus FP is **paraconsistent**.

The taming of Russell's Paradox

Russell's Paradox. Let $t \triangleq \lambda x.(x \notin x)$, where $t \notin t \triangleq (t \in t \rightarrow \perp)$.

$$\frac{\frac{\frac{t \in t^{(1)}}{t \notin t}}{\perp}}{t \notin t} \quad t \in t^{(1)}}{\perp} \quad \frac{\frac{t \in t^{(1)}}{t \notin t}}{\perp} \quad t \in t^{(1)}}{t \notin t}$$

- $\vdash_{\text{FP}} (t \in t) \wedge (t \notin t)$ (failure of Aristotle's **Principle of non-contradiction**).
- But $\not\vdash_{\text{FP}} \perp$.
- **Contraction rule** is used.
- Naïve Set Theory without contraction is consistent [Grishin82]. This amounts to a Set Theory with Girard's Linear Logic without exponentials.
- Minimal logic is already inconsistent because of contraction.

Leibniz Equality $t_1 = t_2 \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \forall x. t_1 \in x \leftrightarrow t_2 \in x .$

Extensionality Equality $t_1 \simeq t_2 \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \forall x. x \in t_1 \leftrightarrow x \in t_2 .$

- $\vdash_{\text{FP}} t_1 \simeq t_2 \rightarrow t_1 = t_2 .$
- The converse implication amounts to the **Extensionality Axiom** $t_1 = t_2 \rightarrow t_1 \simeq t_2 .$
- [Grishin82]: adding Extensionality Axiom, contraction rule is admissible.
- $\text{FP} + \text{Ext} \vdash_{\text{FP}} \perp .$

Developing Mathematics in FP

- **Recursive definitions** in FP as in **functional programming**.
- **Fixed Point Theorem**: Given a formula A with free variables x, z_1, \dots, z_n , $n > 0$, there exists u s.t.

$$\vdash_{\text{FP}} \vec{z} \in u \longleftrightarrow A[u/x].$$

- **Numerals**: Let $A_{\text{Nat}} \triangleq z = 0 \vee \exists y. (y \in x \wedge z = \langle S, y \rangle)$.
Then there exists a term Nat s.t.

$$\vdash_{\text{FP}} z \in \text{Nat} \longleftrightarrow (z = 0 \vee \exists y. (y \in \text{Nat} \wedge z = \langle S, y \rangle)).$$

- **Factorial**: Let $A_{\text{Fact}} \triangleq ((z_1 = 0 \wedge z_2 = 1) \vee \exists y_1, y_2. (z_1 = y_1 + 1 \wedge \langle y_1, y_2 \rangle \in x \wedge z_2 = y_2 \times z_1))$.
Then there exists a term Fact s.t.

$$\vdash_{\text{FP}} \langle z_1, z_2 \rangle \in \text{Fact} \longleftrightarrow ((z_1 = 0 \wedge z_2 = 1) \vee \exists y_1, y_2. (z_1 = y_1 + 1 \wedge \langle y_1, y_2 \rangle \in \text{Fact} \wedge z_2 = y_2 \times z_1)).$$

- FP is a **universal model of computation**.

FP in Type Theory based on Logical Frameworks

Problem: capture the side-condition of normal deductions.

In [Honsell-Liquori-Scagnetto2016] FP is encoded in $\text{LLF}_{\mathcal{P}}$.

$\text{LLF}_{\mathcal{P}}$ extends LF with the **lock constructor** for building objects $\mathcal{L}_{N,\sigma}^{\mathcal{P}}[M]$ of type $\mathcal{L}_{N,\sigma}^{\mathcal{P}}[\rho]$. Locks allow to factor out specific constraints.

An **unlock destructor**, $\mathcal{U}_{N,\sigma}^{\mathcal{P}}[M]$, and an **elimination rule** ($O \cdot \text{Top} \cdot \text{Unlock}$), eliminates the lock-type constructor, under the condition that a specific predicate \mathcal{P} is verified, possibly **externally**, on a judgement:

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash_{\Sigma} M : \rho \quad \Gamma \vdash_{\Sigma} N : \sigma}{\Gamma \vdash_{\Sigma} \mathcal{L}_{N,\sigma}^{\mathcal{P}}[M] : \mathcal{L}_{N,\sigma}^{\mathcal{P}}[\rho]} \text{(O·Lock)} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash_{\Sigma} M : \mathcal{L}_{N,\sigma}^{\mathcal{P}}[\rho] \quad \mathcal{P}(\Gamma \vdash_{\Sigma} N : \sigma)}{\Gamma \vdash_{\Sigma} \mathcal{U}_{N,\sigma}^{\mathcal{P}}[M] : \rho} \text{(O·Top·Unlock)}$$

Equality rule for lock types (**lock reduction**): $\mathcal{U}_{N,\sigma}^{\mathcal{P}}[\mathcal{L}_{N,\sigma}^{\mathcal{P}}[M]] \rightarrow_{\mathcal{L}} M$.

Capitalizing on the **monadic nature** of the lock constructor, one can use locked terms without necessarily establishing the predicate, provided an **outermost** lock is present.

In our encoding, the **global** normalization constraint is enforced **locally** by specifying a suitable lock on the proof-object:

- the obvious predicate to use in the lock-type (*i.e.*, checking that a proof term is normalizable) would not be well-behaved: free variables, *i.e.* assumptions, have to be “sterilized”;
- hence, we make a distinction between **generic judgements**, which can be assumed, but not used directly, and **apodictic judgements**, which are directly involved in proof rules;
- in order to make use of generic judgements, one has to downgrade them to apodictic ones, by a suitable coercion function.

The encoding of FP in $LLF_{\mathcal{P}}$

The signature is the following:

$$\begin{array}{ll} o : \text{Type} & \iota : \text{Type} \\ T : o \rightarrow \text{Type} & \delta : \Pi A : o. (\forall(A) \rightarrow T(A)) \\ V : o \rightarrow \text{Type} & \lambda_{\text{intro}} : \Pi A : \iota \rightarrow o. \Pi x : \iota. T(A \ x) \rightarrow T(\epsilon \ x \ (\text{lam } A)) \\ \text{lam} : (\iota \rightarrow o) \rightarrow \iota & \lambda_{\text{elim}} : \Pi A : \iota \rightarrow o. \Pi x : \iota. T(\epsilon \ x \ (\text{lam } A)) \rightarrow T(A \ x) \\ \epsilon : \iota \rightarrow \iota \rightarrow o & \supset_{\text{intro}} : \Pi A, B : o. (\forall(A) \rightarrow T(B)) \rightarrow (T(A \supset B)) \\ \supset : o \rightarrow o \rightarrow o & \supset_{\text{elim}} : \Pi A, B : o. \Pi x : T(A). \Pi y : T(A \supset B) \rightarrow \mathcal{L}_{\langle x, y \rangle, T(A) \times T(A \supset B)}^{\text{Fitch}} [T(B)] \end{array}$$

where:

- o is the type of propositions,
- \supset and the “membership” predicate ϵ are the syntactic constructors for propositions,
- lam is the “abstraction” operator for building “sets”,
- T is the apodictic judgement,
- V is the generic judgement,
- δ is the coercion function,
- $\langle x, y \rangle$ denotes the encoding of pairs.

In the type of the constructor \supset_{elim} :

$$\supset_{\text{elim}} : \prod A, B : o . \prod x : T(A) . \prod y : T(A \supset B) \rightarrow \mathcal{L}_{\langle x, y \rangle, T(A) \times T(A \supset B)}^{\text{Fitch}} [T(B)]$$

the predicate $\text{Fitch}(\Gamma \vdash_{\Sigma_{\text{FPST}}} \langle x, y \rangle \Leftarrow T(A) \times T(A \supset B))$ holds iff: x and y have **skeletons** in $\Lambda_{\Sigma_{\text{FPST}}}$, i.e. can be expressed as instantiations of contexts such that all the holes of which have

- either type o
- or are guarded by a δ , and hence have type $V(A)$,

and, moreover, the proof derived by combining the skeletons of x and y is **normalizable** in the natural sense.

Theorem (Adequacy for Fitch-Prawitz Naive Set Theory)

If A_1, \dots, A_n are the atomic formulas occurring in B_1, \dots, B_m, A , then $B_1 \dots B_m \vdash_{\text{FPST}} A$ iff there exists a normalizable M such that $A_1 : o, \dots, A_n : o, x_1 : V(B_1), \dots, x_m : V(B_m) \vdash_{\Sigma_{\text{FPST}}} M \Leftarrow T(A)$ (where A , and B_i represent the encodings of, respectively, A and B_i in $\text{CLLF}_{\mathcal{P}}$, for $1 \leq i \leq m$).

The Theory of Hyperuniverses TH

The naive Comprehension Principle can be approximated, by restricting the class of admissible formulæ.

Generalized Positive Comprehension Scheme (GPC)

[Forti-Hinnion89, Forti-Honsell89]

$\{x \mid A\}$ is a set, if A is a **Generalized Positive Formula**,

where **Generalized Positive Formulæ (GPF)** are the smallest class of formulæ

- including $u \in t$, $u = t$;
- closed under the logical connectives \wedge, \vee ;
- closed under the quantifiers $\forall x, \exists x, \forall x \in y, \exists x \in y$, where $\forall x \in y.A$ ($\exists x \in y.A$) is an abbreviation for $\forall x.(x \in y \rightarrow A)$ ($\exists x.(x \in y \rightarrow A)$);
- closed under the formula $\forall x.(B \rightarrow A)$, where A is a generalized positive formula and B is any formula such that $Fv(B) \subseteq \{x\}$. Akin to restricted quantification.

The Theory of Hyperuniverses **TH**, namely **GPC + Extensionality**, is **consistent** [Forti-Honsell89].

Set-theoretic Structures and $\mathcal{P}(\)$ -coalgebras

- A **set-theoretic structure** (X, \in) is a first-order structure with a predicate \in on $X \times X$.
- Set-theoretic structures are **coalgebras** for the **powerset functor** $\mathcal{P}(\)$:

$$f_X : X \longrightarrow \mathcal{P}(X) \quad f_X(x) = \{y \mid y \in x\} .$$

- A $\mathcal{P}(\)$ -coalgebra (X, f_X) is **extensional** if f_X is injective.
- A $\mathcal{P}(\)$ -coalgebra (X, f_X) is **strongly extensional** if the unique coalgebra morphism from (X, f_X) into the final coalgebra is injective.

The Extensional Quotient of the Fitch-Prawitz Coalgebra

- **Fitch-Prawitz Coalgebra** $f_{\mathcal{T}^0} : \mathcal{T}^0 \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{T}^0)$

$$f_{\mathcal{T}^0}(t) = \{u \mid \vdash_{\text{FP}} u \in t\} .$$

- **Bisimilarity** can be defined in FP:

$$\sim \triangleq \{\langle t, t' \rangle \mid \exists R. (\langle t, t' \rangle \in R \wedge A_{\text{Bis}}[R/x])\} ,$$

where $A_{\text{Bis}} \triangleq \forall t, t' (\langle t, t' \rangle \in x \rightarrow$
 $\forall u (u \in t \rightarrow \exists u' (u' \in t' \wedge \langle u, u' \rangle \in x)) \wedge$
 $\forall u' (u' \in t' \rightarrow \exists u. (u \in t \wedge \langle u, u' \rangle \in x))) .$

- **\sim -quotient of the FP-coalgebra:** for any $t \in \mathcal{T}^0$, $\underline{t} \in \mathcal{M}$, where

$$\underline{t} \triangleq \{t' \mid \vdash_{\text{FP}} t \sim t'\} .$$

- $\mathcal{P}(\)$ -coalgebra on \mathcal{M} , $f_{\mathcal{M}} : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{M})$:

$$f_{\mathcal{M}}(\underline{t}) = \{\underline{s} \mid \vdash_{\text{FP}} s \in t\} .$$

Strong Extensionality of \mathcal{M} in FP^+

We work in FP^+ , i.e. FP plus

$$\text{(Bounded-}\omega\text{)} \quad \frac{A[w/x] \text{ for all closed } w \text{ s.t.} \\ B[w/x], \text{Fv}(B) \subseteq \{x\}}{\forall x.(B[w/x] \rightarrow A)}$$

Proposition

The quotient \mathcal{M} is *extensional*, i.e. for all $\underline{t}, \underline{t}' \in \mathcal{M}$,

$$\underline{t} = \underline{t}' \iff f_{\mathcal{M}}(\underline{t}) = f_{\mathcal{M}}(\underline{t}') .$$

Moreover, \mathcal{M} is *strongly extensional*.

\mathcal{M} satisfies the **Generalized Positive Comprehension Scheme**, namely it is a **hyperuniverse**.

Definition

Given a A formula with constants in \mathcal{M} , we define \hat{A} corresponding formula in FP^+ :

$$\begin{aligned} A \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \underline{u} \in \underline{t} &\implies \hat{A} \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \exists u'. u' \sim u \wedge u' \in t & A \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \neg A_1 &\implies \hat{A} \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \neg \hat{A}_1 \\ A \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \underline{u} = \underline{t} &\implies \hat{A} \stackrel{\Delta}{=} u \sim t & A \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \forall x. A_1 &\implies \hat{A} \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \forall x. \hat{A}_1 \\ & \dots & & \end{aligned}$$

Theorem (\mathcal{M} satisfies GPC)

For any formula A in GPF with free variable x ,

$$\mathcal{M} \models \underline{t} \in \underline{v} \iff \mathcal{M} \models A[\underline{t}/x], \text{ where } \underline{v} \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \underline{\{x \mid \hat{A}\}}.$$

- **Alternative Inner Models:** \mathcal{M} satisfies strong extensionality, but there are inner models which have more than one **selfsingleton** and hence do not satisfy strong extensionality.
- **The ubiquitous hyperuniverse $\mathcal{N}_\omega(\emptyset)$:**
 - $\mathcal{N}_\omega(\emptyset)$ is **Cantor-1** space;
 - $\mathcal{N}_\omega(\emptyset)$ is the unique solution of the metric equation $X \cong \mathcal{P}_{cl}(X_{\frac{1}{2}})$;
 - $\mathcal{N}_\omega(\emptyset)$ is the space of **maximal** points of the solution in Plotkin's category of **SFP domains** of $X \cong \mathcal{P}_P(X_\perp) \oplus_\perp 1$
[Alessi-Baldan-Honsell03]
 - $\mathcal{N}_\omega(\emptyset)$ is the free **Stone modal Algebra** over 0 generators.
 - **Conjecture:** $\mathcal{N}_\omega(\emptyset)$ is the **extensional quotient** of **Fitch-Prawitz coalgebra**.